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Ethics, evolution and the a priori: Ross on Spencer and the French sociologists1 
 
Hallvard Lillehammer 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For large parts of the Twentieth Century much moral philosophy in the Anglophone 
tradition took place in isolation from the study of the natural history of human morality, 
including evolutionary biology.2 To a large extent, this isolationist tendency remains an 
important part of the philosophical landscape today.3 In this chapter I raise three questions 
about this tendency. First, what explains the detachment of philosophical attention from 
empirical questions about the natural history of morality during this period? It may be 
tempting to think that the philosophers of the time simply ignored the main developments 
of the emerging human sciences of their time, but a closer reading of the seminal works 
of the period shows that they did not. On the contrary, they explicitly responded to these 
developments, and turned away from them on the basis of what they thought of as 
decisive arguments. So, why did these philosophers turn away from these developments? 
It may be tempting to think the explanation is closely connected to the alleged diagnosis 
of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (Moore 1903), but once 
                                                 
1 Parts of this material have been presented at the Institute of Advanced Study at the 
University of Helsinki in 2013, at the Centre for Research in Arts Humanities and the 
Social Sciences (CRASSH) at Cambridge University in 2014, and at a workshop at 
Florida State University in 2015. I am grateful to the audience on those occasions, and to 
numerous friends and colleagues for helpful comments and suggestions along the way. 
2 For two notable exceptions, see e.g. Mackie 1977; Ruse 1986. 
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more a closer reading of seminal works of the period shows that this hypothesis overplays 
the metaphysical and semantic aspects of their arguments at the expense of their 
epistemological and normative aspects. This hypothesis is reflected in the prevalence of 
what may be called a ‘metaphysics first’, as opposed to an ‘epistemology first’ approach 
to the interpretation of the moral philosophy of the period. (See e.g. Hurka 2014.) The 
present paper is an attempt to rethink this approach, which in my view suffers from a 
degree of anachronism. Third, were the philosophers in question right to turn away from 
these developments? It may be tempting to think that philosophers at the time turned 
away from these developments for reasons that more recent philosophy has either 
outgrown or transcended, but in fact their reasons for doing so turn out to display striking 
similarities with a way of responding to analogous arguments that remains widely 
accepted at the start if the Twentieth-first Century (c.f. Audi 1996; Shafer-Landau 2003; 
Peacocke 2004). They therefore remain directly relevant to contemporary discussions of 
morality and evolution. 
 
In this chapter I critically discuss the dismissal of the philosophical significance of facts 
about human evolution and historical development in the work of one of the seminal 
figures in early ‘analytical’ moral philosophy, namely W. D Ross (1877-1971). I address 
Ross’s views about the philosophical significance of the emerging human sciences of his 
time in two of his main works, namely The Right and the Good (1930) and The 
Foundations of Ethics (1939). Where the latter work contains a discussion and dismissal 
of Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary ethics, the former work contains a discussion of French 
sociology which, although not explicitly directed at an example of evolutionary ethics as 
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normally understood, is nevertheless directly relevant to (and to some extent 
foreshadows) contemporary responses to so-called evolutionary ‘debunking arguments’ in 
ethics (see e.g. Joyce 2005; Singer 2005; Berker 2009). For reasons that will become 
clear in what follows, it is largely irrelevant exactly what form the evolutionary theory to 
which Ross responds actually takes, e.g. whether it is a form of Darwinian natural 
selection or some other account of the emergence and development of our moral faculty. 
 
2. Ross on Spencer and evolutionary ethics 
 
Ross explicitly confronts the philosophical challenges presented by evolutionary ethics in 
one of the less widely read sections of his Gifford lectures, published as The Foundations 
of Ethics in 1939. The main target of Ross’s discussion in these sections is Herbert 
Spencer’s evolutionary ethics, as read mainly through the spectacles of Moore’s 1903 
discussion of the same topic in Principia Ethica. In fact, there is substantial overlap 
between Moore and Ross with respect to which aspects of Spencer’s work they address in 
their respective responses to Spencer’s version of evolutionary ethics. For example, at 
one point Moore directly quotes a number of passages from Spencer’s The Data of Ethics, 
including the following: 
 
No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling 
called by whatever name – gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure, 
somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of 
the conception. (Spencer 1894, Sect. 16) 
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Moore’s response to Spencer, in Principia Ethica, is as follows: 
 
Mr Spencer himself tells us his ‘proof’ is that ‘reversing the application of the 
words’ good and bad… ‘creates absurdities’ (Sect. 16)… So… he is… a naturalistic 
Hedonist. (Moore 1903, 104-105) 
 
What Moore appears to be saying is that Spencer is not, at bottom, an ‘evolutionary 
ethicist’ (in the sense of someone who seeks to ‘derive’ moral claims from naturalistic 
claims about human biology and the like), as much as a philosophical hedonist about the 
good, who also happens to think that evolution proceeds by producing more pleasure, and 
therefore more good on the whole. The fundamental case for Spencer’s hedonism is not 
that it somehow ‘derives’ from, or even accords with, the direction of evolution; but 
rather that its denial ‘creates absurdities’. As Moore sees it, this is most plausibly read as 
an a priori claim about which ideas can be coherently affirmed together, and is therefore 
one that can be made from the comfort of the armchair, hence without any prior appeal to, 
or knowledge of, evolutionary theory.   
 
In his later discussion in The Foundations of Ethics Ross makes exactly the same move. 
Ross claims that Spencer’s ‘fundamental ethical theory’ is that ‘it is conduciveness to 
pleasure that is… the real ground of rightness’; that ‘life always contains a surplus of 
pleasure over pain; and that co nduciveness to life and conduciveness to pleasure always 
go together’; that therefore ‘[h]is fundamental theory turns out to be universalistic 
Hedonism, or Utilitarianism’; and that consequently evolutionary ethics ‘need not be 
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examined as a separate form of theory regarding the ground of rightness’ (Ross 1939, 59). 
Once more, then, Spencer is said to be at bottom a philosophical hedonist, and not an 
‘evolutionary ethicist’ (as defined above) at all. (The exact nature of Spencer’s 
‘hedonism’ is a separate question I shall not pursue here. For present purposes it matters 
less what Spencer actually thought about pleasure than what Ross and his philosophical 
contemporaries took him to think.4) 
 
Moore and Ross are by no means alone among moral philosophers of this period in 
responding to Spencer in this way. In The Theory of Good and Evil, published in 1907 
(but substantially written some time earlier), Hastings Rashdall has a similar go at 
Spencer, when he writes that ‘[m]orality essentially consists in the promotion of a good or 
ideal of life, the nature of which is discerned by our rational judgements of value’, at least 
some of which are self evident a priori. (Rashdall 1907, 401). Explicitly targeting 
Spencer, Rashdal notes that ‘[t]here are… parts of Spencer’s writings… in which he 
would seem almost prepared to admit the simple, a priori unanalyzable character of the 
idea of Right’ (Rashdall 1907, 368), and that ‘[h]is judgement that pleasure is the sole 
good is, in short, like all ultimate moral principles, an a priori judgement of value, true or 
false’ (Rashdall 1907, 372), although Rashdall claims to find no evidence of this view in 
The Data of Ethics, which is the work cited by Moore and Ross on this topic (Rashdall 
1907, 369), and which includes the very claim about pleasure being ‘an inexpugnable 
element of the conception’, that  Rashdall himself quotes on p. 379 of his book. On the 
whole, Rashdall’s treatment of Spencer is characterized by a noticeably acidic tone, as 
when he claims that most of the empirical claims on which Spencer’s argument really 
                                                 
4 For further discussion, see Francis 2007. 
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depends were ‘fairly well known before’ the emergence of evolutionary theory (Rashdall 
1907, 361); that Spencer’s data is based on ‘his experience of a Somersetshire village in 
1834-6, and not upon any study of the habits either of the Amoeba or the ‘peaceful 
Arafuras’’, and that ‘[a]ll the biological and sociological apparatus… was simply an 
afterthought, an attempt to invoke the supposed ‘teaching of Science’ in support of 
foregone conclusions’ (Rashdall 1907, 397). Essentially the same response can be found 
in an essay by Rashdall’s Oxford contemporary R. R. Marett from 1902, where Marett 
writes of ‘that other a priorist Mr Spencer' that ‘insofar as it pretended to rest on history, 
‘rational utilitarianism’ was a sham. Its appeal was never to veritable history, but to… the 
‘is really’ of an a priori metaphysical naturalism’ (Marett 1902, 246, 265).5 
 
Either way, Marett, Moore, Rashdall and Ross all claim that insofar as Spencer’s alleged 
philosophical hedonism has any legitimate claim to our philosophical attention, this is 
because its truth or falsity must be assumed to be knowable a priori, and regardless of the 
plausibility of any theory of evolution, whether of a Darwinian, Spencerian or any other 
kind.  No development in evolutionary theory, past, present or future, therefore has the 
potential to change our fundamental moral beliefs one way or the other. With respect to 
the basic truths of morality, evolutionary theory, like all empirical speculation about the 
nature and development of ethics, is ‘simply beside the mark’ (Ross 1930, 15). This 
dismissive response to evolutionary ethics on the part of Ross and his philosophical 
contemporaries was a simple function of their a prioristic methodology. 
                                                 
5 Marett rejected this kind of naturalism, but also expressed a sceptical attitude towards 
the ‘unconditional dualism’ of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ embodied in the a prioristic non-
naturalism with which his more influential contemporaries are associated (c.f. Marett 
1902, 246ff). 
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Did Ross and his fellow a priorists get Spencer right, or did they fail to grasp the place of 
his claims about the foundations of moral knowledge in his wider science of human 
morality? The issue is not entirely straightforward, at least for two reasons. First, much of 
the inspiration of Spencer’s ethics derives from a heterogenous tradition of British moral 
philosophy that is neither always clear nor always consistent on this issue (see 
Schneewind 2003). Second, Spencer’s views on morality changed substantially over time, 
at least sometimes without either explicit acknowledgement or revision of earlier views.6 
What is entirely straightforward is that at some point in his career Spencer did express a 
commitment the sorts of claims that Ross and his fellow a priorists latched onto. Thus, in 
his 1853 paper ‘The Universal Postulate’ (republished in part as ‘General Analysis’ in 
The Principles of Psychology in 1855), Spencer writes that ‘[m]ean what we mean by the 
word truth, we have no choice but to hold that a belief which is proved, by the 
inconceivableness of its negation, to invariably exist, is true’ (Spencer 1853, 530; quoted 
in Francis 2007, 179), and that ‘the invariable existence of a belief [is] our sole warrant 
for every truth of immediate consciousness, and for every primary generalization of the 
truths of immediate consciousness… [and] our sole warrant for every demonstration’ 
(Spencer 528-9; quoted in Francis 2007, 179).7 Spencer’s application of this ‘universal 
postulate’ in these passages is meant to provide a reconciliation of his broadly empiricist 
philosophy with the ‘common sense’ rejection of scepticism. The analogous application 
of the postulate to basic moral beliefs will have been tempting, if not irresistible. Hence 
                                                 
6 For further discussion of both points, see Francis 2007, 157-210. 
7 Even if conceivability is an infallible guide to possibility (which is controversial), our 
ability to believe need not be an infallible guide to conceivability. Pursuing this issue 
further would take me too far afield here. 
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in The Data of Ethics, Spencer claims that ‘there is no escape from the admission that in 
calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or 
destroys it… we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total 
effects are pleasurable or painful (Spencer 1894, 28); that ‘[t]o prove this it needs but to 
observe how impossible it would be to think of them as we do, if their effects were 
reversed’ (Spencer 1894, 31); that this is a ‘fundamental assumption’ (Spencer 1984, 40) 
or ‘postulate’ that is ‘universally accepted’ (Spencer 1894, 45); and that ‘reversing the 
applications of the words creates absurdities’ (Spencer 1894, 45). Pleasure, says Spencer, 
‘is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of 
intellectual intuition’. It is ‘an inexpugnable element of the conception’ (Spencer 1894, 
46).   
From the perspective of Ross and his fellow a priorists, whether the basic truths in 
question are described as ‘a priori self evident principles’; ‘first principles of reason’; 
‘fundamental and indispensable assumptions’; or are assigned some other (from their 
perspective) salutary label, is less important than the fact that no appeal to experience 
beyond the armchair, much less the theory of evolution, would seem to be necessary in 
order to arrive at them. Spencer’s attraction to ‘the philosophy of common sense’ and the 
universal postulate he appears to have extracted from it is easily recognizable as a core 
element of the ‘ethical intuitionism’ of Ross and his allies. They were therefore within 
their rights to point out that Spencer’s evolutionary ethics did not seem to rest (at least at 
this point) on an a posteriori appeal to the history or evolution of our moral faculties, 
even if they were wrong to underplay the extent to which his broader theory was 
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undeniably more empirically tractable in other ways than their own.8 
 
3. Ross on the French sociologists 
 
In the opening chapter of what may be his most widely read work, The Right and the 
Good, Ross briefly takes it upon himself to argue against the temptation to draw any 
significant moral or epistemological conclusions from the empirical study of the causes or 
functions of moral beliefs; biological, historical or otherwise. His main target in the 
relevant passages (less than three pages in total, but strategically placed in the first 
chapter of the book) is the emerging science of sociology, here in the guise of Emile 
Durkheim and Lucien Levy-Bruhl, both of whom Ross appears to have read (or at least 
have read about) in the original French.9 Addressing this work and its significance for 
moral philosophy, Ross writes: 
 
[I]t may be well to refer briefly to a theory which has enjoyed much popularity, … 
the theory of the sociological school of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl, which seeks to 
replace moral philosophy by the ‘science de moeurs’, the historical and 
comparative study of the moral beliefs and practices of mankind. It would be 
                                                 
8 For a longer discussion of ‘the universal postulate’ in Spencer’s thought, see Francis 
2007, 171-186. 
9 The work to which Ross actually refers is Parodi 1910. The sociological work 
responded to by Ross was methodologically similar to that of Ross’s own to the extent 
that it was largely conducted from the armchair. (Indeed, the writers in question would 
have self-identified, and also have been known, as ‘philosophers’ in a sense associated 
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foolish to deny the value of such a study, or the interest of many of the facts it has 
brought to light with regard to the historical origin of many such beliefs and 
practices… What must be denied is the capacity of any such inquiry to take the 
place of moral philosophy. (Ross 1930, 11-12) 
 
According to Ross, the members of this ‘sociological school’ are trapped in what he 
describes as an ‘inconsistency’ (Ross 1930, 13).  On the one hand, they tell us to accept 
‘an existing code as something analogous to an existing law of nature… and on this side 
the school is able… to proclaim itself conservative of moral values’ (Ross 1930, 13). On 
the other hand, by claiming that ‘any code is the product… of bygone superstitions and… 
out of date utilities, it is bound to create… a skeptical attitude towards any and every 
given code’, and thereby make our moral beliefs vulnerable to a form of historical, 
sociological or developmental debunking (Ross 1930, 13). Some readers may see traces 
of ‘Hume’s Law’ or the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ as a diagnostic tool in the passages 
just quoted. Yet when Ross proceeds to deny the philosophical significance of the 
empirical facts that sociology has brought to light, what he offers is not an argument 
against inferring an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ or identifying moral properties with natural 
properties, but instead an argument against a narrowly functional understanding of moral 
beliefs. Thus, he writes:  
 
[T]he analogy which… [sociology] draws between a moral code and a natural 
system like the human body… is an entirely fallacious one. By analyzing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
with that word at least in the continental parts of Europe.) Where it differs from Ross’s 
work is in making no claim to be purely a priori. 
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constituents of the human body you do nothing to diminish the reality of the human 
body as a given fact, and you learn much that will enable you to deal effectively 
with diseases. But beliefs have the characteristic which bodies have not, of being 
true or false, of resting on knowledge or being the products of wishes, hopes and 
fears… (Ross 1930, 13) 
 
Ross’s point is that a reductively functional understanding of moral (and other) beliefs 
fails to take account of the fact that beliefs have contents, the correctness conditions of 
which cannot be assumed to be a simple function of the social or psychological role that 
these beliefs happen to play at any given time or place.  
 
The comparison between moral codes and the human body can be traced to Durkheim’s 
work The Rules of Sociological Method, where Durkheim writes: 
 
For societies, as for individuals, health is good and desirable; sickness on the other 
hand, is bad and must be avoided. If therefore we find an objective criterion, 
inherent in the facts themselves, to allow us to distinguish scientifically health from 
sickness in the various orders of social phenomena, science will be able to throw 
light on practical matters while remaining true to its own method... The state known 
as health... is a valuable reference point to guide our actions... It establishes the 
norm which must serve as a basis for all our practical reasoning. (Durkheim 1982, 
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86-7)10 
 
Yet to say that moral beliefs can be either healthy or unhealthy is not to deny that they 
have evaluable contents, nor is it to deny that the success conditions of moral beliefs are 
distinctive in kind. Nor can Durkheim can be accused of having been unaware of the fact 
that ethical thought is distinctively normative, as when he writes (in his review of Levy-
Bruhl’s Ethics and Moral Science):  
A science can reach conclusions which permit the establishment of norms, but is 
not normative by itself… It is necessary, therefore, to renounce this contradictory 
conception of a normative science and to dissociate definitely science and practice. 
(Durkheim 1993, 30)11 
More charitably, perhaps, Ross could be read as accusing his chosen interlocutors of 
describing the success conditions of moral beliefs in implausibly relativistic terms, as 
when Durkheim writes that ‘theoretical morality… is quite simply a way to coordinate as 
rationally as possible the ideas and feelings which constitute the moral conscience of a 
definite period of time.’ (Durkheim 1993, 32), or that ‘[e]very system has its own 
rationality... Roman morality has its rationale in Roman society just as our morality has 
                                                 
10 Elsewhere, Durkheim writes: ‘Does it not happen constantly that the doctor becomes 
involved in problems for which physiology provides no solution? And what does he do 
then? He opts for the course of action which seems the most reasonable according to the 
present state of knowledge. Rational moral art will proceed likewise’ (Durkheim 1993, 
32). For more about this ‘rational moral art’, see below. 
11 One possibility is that the Durkheim of The Rules of Sociological Method is vulnerable 
to some version of Ross’s argument, but that by the time he comes to review Levy-
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its rationale in the nature of contemporary European society.’ (Durkheim 1993, 48).12  
Ross’s response is telling. Instead of seriously considering the possibility that some 
ethical claims could nevertheless prove themselves to be justified (or even true) even if 
they are in some sense ‘relative’, Ross considers the alternative presented by ‘the 
sociological school’ as the starting point of a journey into the epistemological abyss. He 
immediately goes on to say that the possible (and in some cases actual) mismatch 
between the actual causes and function of moral beliefs and the correctness conditions of 
those beliefs threatens to imply a universal scepticism about the claims expressed by 
those beliefs. He writes that ‘in so far as you can exhibit… [moral beliefs] as being the 
product of purely psychological and non-logical causes of this sort, while you leave intact 
the fact that many people hold such opinions you remove their authority and their claim 
to be carried out in practice’ (Ross 1930, 13). His discussion continues with the following 
oft-cited passage, with which many contemporary philosophers will be familiar (if only in 
part). Ross writes: 
 
[I]f human consciousness is continuous, by descent, with a lower consciousness 
which had no notion of right at all, that need not make us doubt that the notion is an 
ultimate and irreducible one, or that the rightness (prima facie) of certain types of 
act is self-evident; for the nature of the self-evident is not to be evident to every 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bruhl’s book there has been a significant development in his views. For discussion of this 
possibility, see R. T. Hall’s introduction to Durkheim 1993.  
12 Along similar lines, Levy-Bruhl writes of ethical ideals as a ‘projection’ of the ‘social 
reality of the epoch’ that formulates them (Levy Bruhl 1905, 122), and that ‘the character 
of universality, attributed by the conscience of each individual to its dictates… is only the 
logical translation of imperious feeling’ (Levy-Bruhl 1905, 187). The latter claim might 
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mind however undeveloped, but to be apprehended directly by minds that have 
reached a certain level of maturity, and for minds to reach the necessary degree of 
maturity the development that takes place from generation to generation is as much 
needed as that which takes place from infancy to adult life. (Ross, 1930, 12) 
 
What concerns Ross in this passage is that the views of ‘the sociological school’ seem to 
imply that all our claims to moral knowledge are entirely without foundation. He is 
concerned to rebut the challenge that knowledge of the causes and functions of our moral 
beliefs will debunk those beliefs because their contents are unconnected, or at best 
accidentally related to, the justificatory or veridical grounds which they are said to imply 
or presuppose.13  Regardless of the truth-value of a given moral belief – or so the 
challenge goes – our justification for that belief would be undermined if it turns out that 
our possession of it has the wrong kind of relation to what would make it justified, or 
true. Ross writes:  
 
[I]f anyone can show that A holds actions of type B to be wrong simply because 
(for instance) he knows such actions to be forbidden by the society he lives in, he 
                                                                                                                                                 
be interpreted as consistent with an ‘error theoretic’ reading of moral beliefs (But see 
Section 4 Below.) 
13 On this point, Durkheim points out that ‘[h]istorical research can demonstrate that a 
certain moral practice is related to a belief which today is extinct and that the practice is 
thus entirely without foundation’ (Durkheim 1993, 135). Along similar lines, Levy Bruhl 
asks: ‘can it be doubted that a similar analysis of the Western conscience is possible? Do 
we regard the acts that we feel bound to do or not to do, obligatory or forbidden for 
reasons known to us and logically founded? No one would dare to affirm it in every case. 
We often explain them by motives that have nothing in common with their real origin. 
That observation has been made more than once with regard to those particular 
obligations which are the customs and conventions of society’ (Levy-Bruhl 1905, 70). In 
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shows that A has no real reason for believing that such actions have the specific 
quality of wrongness, since between being forbidden by the community and being 
wrong there is no necessary connexion… He does not, indeed, show the belief to 
be untrue, but he shows that A has no sufficient reason for holding it true; and in 
this sense he undermines its validity’ (Ross 1930, 14).14 
 
Ross rejects the debunking challenge outright. His response is as follows: basic moral 
knowledge, in the form of self evident universal principles, is a priori accessible to minds 
that have reached a certain stage of development (or civilization), and therefore regardless 
of any a posteriori knowledge those minds may or may not have of their own evolution or 
history, the social function of their moral sensibility, or any other contingent fact about 
particular moral systems, practices or traditions. Furthermore, Ross appears to be 
confident that the human mind has, in fact, at the time and place of writing, reached a 
stage of development at which basic moral knowledge is accessible in this way, and that 
some people (presumably including himself) actually demonstrate that they have access to 
such knowledge whenever they successfully exercise the relevant capacity (e.g. when they 
correctly rule out certain moral claims as absurd or implausible from the armchair). Ross 
writes: 
 
[T]he human mind… is competent to see that the moral code of one race and age is 
in certain respects inferior to that of another. It has, in fact, an a priori insight into 
                                                                                                                                                 
other words, some moral beliefs may be vulnerable to historical debunking. There is no 
suggestion by either Durkheim or Levy-Bruhl that all of them are. 
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certain broad principles of morality, as it can distinguish between a more or less 
adequate recognition of these principles… [T]here is a system of moral truth, as 
objective as all truth must be, …and from the point of view of this, the genuine 
ethical problem, the sociological inquiry is simply beside the mark. (Ross 1930, 14-
15)15 
 
So what ultimately prevents our moral beliefs from falling into the epistemological abyss, 
and what makes the evolutionary or historical study of the moral beliefs and practices of 
mankind beside the mark in accounting for the foundations of our moral knowledge, is 
that basic moral knowledge consists in the grasp of self-evident principles that are 
knowable a priori, and therefore regardless of any a posteriori knowledge of particular 
ethical systems, practices or traditions. Not only do we not need a comparative study of 
different ethical systems, practices, traditions or their evolution to access these truths; no 
such discovery has the potential to undermine our entitlement to our basic moral beliefs. 
 
4. Did Ross argue against straw men? 
 
In light of Ross’s response to ‘the sociological school’, it might be tempting to think that 
moral philosophy is faced with a dilemma. Either we are entitled to appeal to self evident 
a priori principles in order to explain the objective credentials of our moral beliefs, or 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 The appeal to a ‘necessary connexion’ arguably overstates Ross’s case. For a later 
development of such arguments on explicitly evolutionary terms, see Mackie 1977; Joyce 
2005.  
15 One question that Ross does not answer is how, even if we do have access to a priori 
self evident moral truths, we can be confident that we have actually accessed them, given 
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else we are stuck with an unpalatable form of moral relativism according to which our 
moral beliefs are at best valid strictly relative to a given society, and therefore have no 
genuine objective credentials. It is quite clear that Ross thinks that his chosen 
interlocutors are stuck on the second horn of this dilemma, when he writes: 
 
According to this school, or rather according to its principles if consistently carried 
out, no one moral code is any truer, any nearer to the apprehension of an objective 
moral truth, than any other; each is simply the code that is necessitated by the 
conditions of its time and place, and is that which most completely conduces to the 
preservation of the society that accepts it. (Ross 1930, 14) 
 
To which Ross understandably responds that ‘the human mind is not content with such a 
view’ (Ross 1930, 14).  
 
From these remarks it is natural to infer that Ross’s chosen interlocutors must have failed 
to grasp the epistemological implications of their explanatory project. This claim does not 
stand up to scrutiny. Far from having missed out on the epistemological need for an a 
priori foundation for moral knowledge in self evident principles, Ross’s interlocutors 
(rightly or wrongly): a) explicitly reject the possibility of such a foundation, and b) 
explicitly reject the claim that such a foundation is necessary to prevent the universal 
debunking of our moral beliefs. The idea that we must either be able to ground our moral 
knowledge on a priori self-evident principles or submit to some form of moral skepticism 
                                                                                                                                                 
the variable causes of our moral beliefs and the fact that self evident truths need not be 
obvious. For discussion of the wider implications of this question, see Lillehammer 2011.   
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is (as they see it) based on a mistake.16  
 
With respect to a), Ross’s chosen interlocutors explicitly argue that there is no prospect of 
providing our moral beliefs with an a priori foundation in a set of universal norms and 
principles because the norms and principles in question (even if we could eventually 
come to accept them as universally valid without exception) will inevitably be a 
posteriori projections of the norms and principles embodied in the actual system, practice 
or tradition with which one begins. In Ethics and Moral Science, Levy-Bruhl argues 
against the project of providing moral knowledge with an a priori foundation on exactly 
these grounds. According to Levy-Bruhl, moral thought is essentially a ‘rational art’ that 
consists in developing conceptual tools to address the practical challenges (of survival, 
mutual cooperation, etc.) presented by our contingent natural and historical 
circumstances, and is therefore not a suitable object of a theoretical science in which 
answers to moral questions could be asymmetrically grounded in a set of self-evident 
principles knowable a priori. On the contrary, any rational ethical system, practice or 
tradition ‘has to be entirely constructed’ from the natural and historical materials with 
which we contingently find ourselves (Levy-Bruhl 1905, 204). This process of 
construction will inevitably proceed by engaging critically with existing practice, which it 
will necessarily in some sense reflect, and therefore cannot provide with an a priori and 
practice independent foundation. In other words, there is ‘nothing a priori to authorize 
                                                 
16 A comprehensive assessment of this claim falls outside the remit of this chapter. For a 
related discussion of the French (and other) sociologists on this point, see Abend 2010, 
566-570. See also Lillehammer 2010. 
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the affirmation that becoming is a progress’ (Levy-Bruhl 1905, 175).17 Yet as Levy-Bruhl 
sees it, none of this entails that our moral beliefs are incapable of improvement from one 
generation, or society, to another. What it does entail is that any such improvement is 
possible only in the light of a historically informed, and therefore a posteriori, 
engagement with some particular ethical system, practice or tradition that instantiates it. 
 
With respect to b), Ross’s chosen interlocutors explicitly deny that rational reflection on 
the historical causes and functions of our moral beliefs will necessarily debunk all, or 
even most, of those beliefs. On the contrary, they claim that such reflection has the 
potential to improve those beliefs, insofar as more informed beliefs can, when coherently 
integrated with existing beliefs, be more ‘rational’, or sensible, (and therefore in some 
sense ‘better’) than the beliefs they replace.18 In Ethics and Moral Science, Levy Bruhl 
considers the possibility that if someone ‘learns that… [morality] has no rational 
foundation, that the repulsion… called forth by certain acts are explained by historical 
and psychological reasons’, this will thereby ‘take from them both their prestige and their 
power’ (Levy-Bruhl 1905, 109-9).19 His response to this challenge is as dismissive as 
                                                 
17 Along similar lines, Durkheim writes: ‘Is there not really something strange in positing 
these high questions when we do not know yet... what property rights are, or contract, or 
crime, or punishment, etc., etc. Perhaps the time for synthesis will come some day, but it 
hardly seems to have arrived yet. Therefore, the moral theorist can only respond by an 
admission of ignorance, to the often repeated question, 'What is, or better yet, what are, 
the ultimate principles of morality?’ (Durkheim 1993, 130) 
18 Durkheim writes: ‘The more one becomes familiar with the laws of moral reality, the 
further along one will be in modifying it rationally, in saying what it ought to be’ 
(Durkheim 1993, 31). 
19 Levy-Bruhl also writes (in the same passage and elsewhere) that ethics is ‘relative’. 
What exactly he means by that, and exactly how it relates to various normative or meta-
ethical views commonly known as ‘moral relativism’ is a question worthy of more 
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Ross’s own: 
 
If ethical prescription does not hold its authority from a theoretical conviction or 
from a system of ideas, it could exist by its own strength… The imperative 
character of the ethics now practiced not being derived from reflection, is scarcely 
enfeebled by it. (Levy-Bruhl 1905, 111-12; c.f. Op. Cit. 157)  
 
In other words, the question whether our moral beliefs will survive critical reflection on 
facts about their causes and function is one to which the answer is, at least sometimes, 
affirmative. For example, we sometimes find ourselves in conditions where the reasons 
why we hold certain moral beliefs, and therefore those beliefs themselves, would 
critically withstand reflection on the nature of their own origins. (Just as we sometimes 
find ourselves in circumstances where they don’t, e.g. cases where a moral belief can be 
shown to depend on a falsehood.) Durkheim is equally clear on this point, when he 
writes:  
 
[O]ur moral beliefs are the products of a long evolution, ... they are the result of 
an endless succession of cautious steps, hard work, failures, and all sorts of 
experiences. We do not always perceive the causes that explain our moral beliefs 
because their origins are so distant and so complex. Therefore we ought to treat 
them with respect, since we know that humanity... has not found anything better. 
We can be assured, for the same reasons, that we will find more wisdom 
                                                                                                                                                 
attention than I am able to give it here. For three relevant discussions, see Putnam 1981; 
Williams 1985; Abend 2010. 
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accumulated in them than in the mind of the greatest genious. It would surely be 
childish to try to correct the results of human experience with our own limited 
judgement... Morality would thus have quite enough authority in our minds since 
it would be presented to us as the summary and conclusion, however provisional, 
of human history. (Durkheim 1993, 135). 
 
According to Durkheim, the extent of our justified confidence in our moral beliefs is a 
partly function of the extent to which they have already withstood reflection and 
challenge over time; including empirically informed reflection on their historical causes 
and function. Obviously, not every moral belief would pass this test, partly because some 
moral beliefs obviously conflict, and partly also because some moral beliefs may never 
have been suitably challenged. Yet the idea that knowledge of the causes and function of 
moral beliefs could somehow undermine our moral belief system as a whole is one that 
Durkheim is prepared to dismiss out of hand. 
 
To conclude, not only did Ross take an unduly dismissive view of the philosophical 
significance of ‘the historical and comparative study of the moral beliefs and practices of 
mankind’. He made no serious attempt to engage with those implications as they were 
actually conceived by his chosen interlocutors. In this respect, he is not alone – either 
among his, or among our own, philosophical contemporaries. What exactly to make of 
this fact is an important question, but one I cannot do justice to here. Instead, I will 
conclude this brief discussion of ‘the sociological school’ by suggesting that their 
predominantly a posteriori approach to the study of moral thought may embody a 
philosophically respectable form of epistemological modesty. Once more in the words of  
 22 
Levy-Bruhl:  
 
To conclude, it seems to us that there is no answer to the demand: “Give us a 
system of Ethics!’ because the demand has no object. Only the system they already 
have could be given to those who ask, because if another were suggested they 
would not accept it… [Yet] if ethical rational art does not offer us a ‘system of 
ethics’… it promises not the less to have important consequences; for, thanks to it, 
the ethical reality can be improved within limits impossible to fix beforehand. 
(Levy-Bruhl 1905, 217).  
 
Such an improvement, he claims, would involve ‘the custom of considering the ethics of 
a given society…. in its necessary relation with the social reality of which it forms a part.’ 
On his view, this is a project that is ‘both modest and critical’, rooted as it is in the 
continuous reassessment of our natural and historically conditioned moral beliefs (Levy-
Bruhl 1905, 230). In other words, even in the absence of an a priori self evident 
foundation of our moral beliefs, we could still be entitled to hold onto (at least some of) 
them, and even (sometimes) improve on them. Yet any such improvement would always 
be the result of some empirically tractable engagement with some actual and historically 
embodied moral practice or tradition. Thus understood, it is compatible with the views of 
‘the sociological school’ that by thinking systematically about actual human moralities we 
can come to discover moral principles that apply at all times and in all places (at least 
with respect to beings like ourselves). What is not compatible with this view is that these 
moral principles would thereby have been shown to either have, or stand in need of, a 
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purely a priori, or ‘fact independent’, foundation (c.f. Cohen 2003).20 
 
5. Truth, disagreement and confidence 
 
As we have seen, therefore, both Ross and his chosen interlocutors were acutely aware of 
the moral and epistemological challenges arising from the fact of widespread difference 
and disagreement on ethical questions both ‘in different societies’ and ‘within the same 
society’; in particular ‘a real difference of opinion as to the comparative worth of 
different goods’ (Ross 1939, 17; 19). In response, Ross claims that ‘on examination’ such 
disagreement (at least among ‘sufficiently mature’ minds) can be shown to depend ‘not 
on disagreement about fundamental moral principles, but partly on differences in the 
circumstances of different societies, and partly on different views which people hold, not 
on moral questions but on questions of fact’, including (he might have added) facts about 
human evolution and historical development (Ross 1939, 18). Moreover, Ross claimed, 
‘the very fact of difference of opinion is in itself evidence of the persisting confidence of 
all of us that there is an objective truth’, even if we cannot be reasonably confident that 
we presently know what it is (Ross 1939, 19). Whether or not this claim is too optimistic, 
Ross’s chosen interlocutors could in principle have agreed with him. Yet even if they did 
not actually do so (I don’t claim to have shown that they did), Ross arguably moved too 
quickly when he diagnosed the epistemologically subversive implications of their 
comparative, historical, and therefore essentially a posteriori approach to moral 
                                                 
20 On this reading, Levy-Bruhl’s position can be read as suggestive of a form of ethical 
constructivism. For a paradigm manifestation of constructivism in Twentieth Century 
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philosophy. He therefore also arguably underestimated the challenge of those who think 
that no philosophical account of moral knowledge is plausible that fails to seriously 
engage with the norms and principles of actual moral systems, practices and traditions. 
Among these can be counted not only the French sociologists and their contemporary 
descendants in sociology, anthropology and social psychology, but also those who 
continue to argue for the normative significance of facts about human evolution and 
development, including contemporary proponents of some form of evolutionary ethics 
(see e.g. Ruse 1986; Joyce 2005). Exposing the fault-lines in Ross’s response to these 
challenges not only helps to make explicit what is at stake in these debates but also brings 
out the way in which contemporary discussions of ethics and evolution are themselves 
historically located in a particular intellectual tradition. How much further we have got in 
making sense of these issues in the century or so that has passed since Ross and his 
intuitionist contemporaries responded to Spencer and the French sociologists is an 
interesting question, worthy of further scrutiny. 
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